Constructive engagement was the name given to the policy of the Reagan administration
towards the apartheid
regime in South Africa in the early 1980s. It was promoted as an alternative to the economic sanctions
and divestment from South Africa
demanded by the UN General Assembly
and the international anti-apartheid movement
Encouraging South Africa
The Reagan administration vetoed legislation from the United States Congress
and blocked attempts by the United Nations to impose sanctions and to isolate South Africa. Instead, advocates of constructive engagement sought to use incentives as a means of encouraging South Africa to gradually move away from apartheid. The policy, echoed by the British government of Margaret Thatcher
, came under criticism as South African government repression of the black population and anti-apartheid activism intensified. The policy's architect, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker
, designed it to link the independence of South African–occupied Namibia
to an easing of the arms embargo
against South Africa and the withdrawal of Cuba
n troops from Angola
. Author/journalist Christopher Hitchens
blamed constructive engagement and "the fearlessly soft attitude displayed by Chester Crocker towards apartheid" for the ten-year delay in implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 435
and securing Namibia's independence:
Independence on these terms could have been won years ago if it were not for Crocker's procrastination and Reagan's attempt to change the subject to the presence of Cuban forces in Angola. Here again, the United States dogmatically extended diplomatic recognition to one side only – South Africa's. Here again, without 'neutral' mediators American policy would have deservedly become the victim of its own flagrant bias. An important participant was Bernt Carlsson, UN Commissioner for Namibia, who worked tirelessly for free elections in the colony and tried to isolate the racists diplomatically.
Influence of the Cold War
Ronald Reagan's election in 1980
offered the regime in Pretoria
president who, in an early speech, declared his support for the white minority government of South Africa, and their support for the US in times of war. After the administration of previous President Jimmy Carter
had pledged to support majority rule in South Africa, South African President P. W. Botha
saw in Reagan what he saw in Thatcher: a leader who would respect his regime's battle against communism in Southern Africa. The Cold War and threat of Soviet influence in the region, Namibia in particular, enabled the South African government to appeal to the Reagan administration's fear of an African "domino effect
." In light of this, South Africa received both economic and military aid during Reagan's first term. The US Department of State
also believed that "Constructive Engagement" would lead over time to a regime change. US policy feared a sudden revolution in South Africa as being a potential power vacuum, opening the door to a Marxist
-backed regime, like that in Angola.
Override of presidential veto
The build-up to what was to become the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 can be traced to Archbishop Desmond Tutu
who visited the United States in 1984. This visit occurred after President Reagan's comfortable re-election. Speaking on Capitol Hill
Tutu delivered a speech, declaring "constructive engagement is an abomination, an unmitigated disaster."… "In my view, the Reagan administration's support and collaboration with it is equally immoral, evil, and totally un-Christian." This speech was the turning point for the Reagan administration, and also the beginning of the end of "Constructive Engagement". In April 1985 President Reagan came under attack from within the Republican Party
itself. The Republican majority in the Senate voted 89–4 on a resolution condemning apartheid.
In October 1986, the United States Congress
overrode President Reagan's veto of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act
vote was 78 to 21, the House
vote was 313 to 83). During the lead-up to the override, Reagan appointed Edward Perkins
, who is black, ambassador to South Africa. Conservative Representative Dick Cheney
was opposed to the override, saying that Nelson Mandela
was the head of an organisation that the State Department had deemed "terrorist". In the week leading up to the vote, President Reagan appealed to members of the Republican Party for support, but as Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr.
would state, "For this moment, at least, the President has become an irrelevancy to the ideals, heartfelt and spoken, of America."
The legislation, which banned all new US trade and investment in South Africa, also refused South African Airways
flights landing permission at US airports. This legislation was seen as a catalyst for similar sanctions in Europe and Japan, and signalled the end of the constructive engagement policy.
*Foreign relations of South Africa during apartheid
*South African Border War
* Audie Klotz. 1999. Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid. Cornell University Press.
* Audie Klotz. (1995). Norms reconstituting interests: Global racial equality and U.S. sanctions against South Africa. International Organization, 49(3), 451-478.
* Culverson, D. R. (1996). The Politics of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United States, 1969-1986. Political Science Quarterly, 111(1), 127.
* Francis Njubi Nesbitt. Race for Sanctions: African Americans against Apartheid, 1946-1994. Indiana University Press.
*Pauline Baker, The United States and South Africa: The Reagan Years (New York: Ford Foundation).
* Robert Fatton, Jr., "The Reagan Policy Toward South Africa: Ideology and the New Cold War," African Studies Review 27 (March 1984)~ 57-82.
Category:South Africa–United States relations
Category:Economy of South Africa
Category:Presidency of Ronald Reagan
Category:History of the foreign relations of the United States
Category:Foreign policy doctrines